

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
WESTERN COUNTRIES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Syllabus

Costin Ciobanu
Clara Neupert-Wentz
Jan Vogler

1. Introduction – the goals and aims of the course

Political Institutions: Western countries, The European Union and International Organizations (PI) deals with political systems and their interactions. Its focus is on providing students with an understanding of how political systems work as well as the causes and consequences of institutional differences for the representativeness and efficiency of political decision-making processes.

The course contains three core elements: 1) national political systems and institutional differences between these systems; 2) institutionalized interactions between states; and 3) the European Union as a specific case of such institutionalized interactions. These three elements will be approached in two course blocks.

The first block of the course provides insights into the political systems of selected countries and the significance of key institutional differences across political systems. This includes differences between presidential and parliamentary systems, federal states and unitary states, and the modes of operation in parliaments and governments.

The second block of the course concentrates on the interaction between domestic political systems and global or regional-level international institutions. In particular, we focus on theories aimed at explaining the formation and operation of international institutions, addressing the question of whether international institutions are under 'control' by states or whether they can get a 'life of their own'. Furthermore, we spend several weeks focusing on the EU's political system as a particular case of institutionalized interactions between states. During those weeks we examine the executive, legislative and judicial politics in the EU as well as the current state of democracy in the EU and elections to the European Parliament.

The goal of the course is to give students a general knowledge of how political institutions at various levels of governance function, develop and influence democratic representation and decision-making. Specifically, the course aims to give students the following competences:

- The student is able to describe the political system of selected Western countries, the EU, regional institutions, and international organizations.
- The student is able to describe selected theories of how political actors interact in different institutional contexts.
- The student is able to compare key empirical differences between political systems, identifying their differences and similarities.
- The student is able to compare selected theories about the relationship between political actors and institutions and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these theories.
- The student is able to apply the general methods of political science to independently and systematically analyze issues regarding institutions, political systems and their interaction.

- The student is able to apply the theories of the course to analyze empirical material and issues regarding institutions and their interaction to independently and systematically discuss and assess the relevance and scope of application of these theories.

These overall learning objectives can be divided into three major headings (as illustrated in Table 1): theoretical knowledge, empirical knowledge and an ability to apply theories to empirical material.


Table 1. Overall learning objectives for the course

| Theory | Empirical knowledge | Application |
|--|--|--|
| <p>The student is able to describe selected theories of how political actors interact in and through political institutions.</p> <p>The student is able to compare selected theories about the relationship between political actors and institutions and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these theories</p> | <p>The student is able to describe the political system of selected Western countries, the EU and selected international organizations.</p> <p>The student is able to compare key empirical differences between political systems, identifying their differences and similarities.</p> | <p>The student is able to apply the general methods of political science to independently and systematically analyze issues regarding institutions, political systems and their interaction.</p> <p>The student is able to apply the theories of the course to analyze empirical material and issues regarding institutions and their interaction. The goal here is to independently and systematically discuss and assess the relevance and scope of application of these theories.</p> |

2. The relation of the course to other courses on the BA in Political Science

The course is closely connected to other BA courses in political science at Aarhus University. Figure 1 places PI in relation to other courses taught on the BA education through a simplified version of an input-output model. It should be noted that the model is a simplified presentation and certain overlaps will occur between the different courses. *General Political Science* (Almen Statskundskab) deals with the input side of the political system. It presents knowledge of and theories about social cleavages, opinion formation, the role of public opinion and political participation. *Public Policy* (Offentlig Politik) focuses on the outcome side – political decisions, policies, regimes and reforms that are treated as the dependent variable. *International Relations* (International Politik) deals with the international systems and how states interact and conduct their foreign policies. The focus is on the structure of the international system and the role of conflicts and cooperation between states. *Political Institutions* focuses on what happens in the so-called ‘black box’ between demands expressed in civil society and policies influencing the living conditions in a society.

Figure 1: The PI course role in the BA program



3. The organization of the course

Studying what happens in a black box is per definition difficult. In PI, we open the black box by studying the way power is organized in central political institutions and how they operate in order to reach political decisions. We thus study the role of the structures as well as the modus operandi of selected political institutions.

The classic input-output models are primarily limited to and aimed at understanding domestic politics and distributive processes on this level. However, to give a comprehensive understanding of how the most important political institutions are structured and function, we need to acknowledge that modern governance is multilayered. There are multiple layers of authority from municipalities over nation-states to supranational organizations. PI needs to draw on insight from Comparative Politics (CP) as well as International Relations (IR) to understand these different layers of authority and the way power is structured within as well as between states. The overall theoretical framework used to bridge CP and IR is theories of institutionalism. Institutionalism focuses on how institutions are created and their effects on behavior and policies.

PI is organized according to the different layers of governance in modern developed democracies.

We begin the course with a general introduction to the concept of institutions and theories about the relationship between actors and institutions (L1). This general framework is relevant for all aspects of the course even though a somewhat different terminology is used in the different research traditions.

- In the first block (weeks 1-5), we focus on the national level of governance. Empirically, we focus on Western democracies when applying typologies to describe national political institutions such as electoral systems, legislatures and executives.
- The second block (weeks 6-15) deals with institutions beyond the nation-state. At first, we will discuss why states choose to create international institutions and how such institutions work. We will then assess why some states choose to withdraw from international institutions and why some institutions persist or die. Next, we will focus on the European Union as a particular example of institutionalized interactions between nation states. In the beginning, the political system of the EU will be explained in detail. Subsequently, we analyse the executive, legislative and judicial politics of the EU. Ultimately, we step beyond explaining the central institutions and policies of the EU and discuss the current state of democracy in the EU.

4. Course Set-up

PI is organized like most other BA courses with four hours of teaching per week: two hours of lectures and two hours of class discussions. The exam is a six-hour written exam, and after the course, students are expected to be able to describe political institutions and theories about them and to be able to compare these institutions and theories in a theoretically informed

empirical analysis. The descriptive element of the course is thus strong, giving students an opportunity to gather empirical knowledge of various political institutions on the national as well as the international level of governance.

To make the teaching activities support the achievement of the learning objectives, lectures will focus on providing knowledge of concepts, typologies, and theories for defining, classifying, and understanding the function and structure of political institutions, while classes will focus on applying these concepts, typologies, and theories on empirical material.

Lectures as well as classes will be taught in English. The final exam can be written in Danish or English.

5. Weekly Assignments and Exam Questions

We usually pose exam questions including descriptive, analytical and discussion elements. There is no “perfect” form for any of these tasks. A good description, analysis or discussion depends on the substance in question as well as personal style. Still, it might be relevant to specify what we think of when posing questions related to descriptions, analyses and discussions.

A *description* is an independent problem-focused account of relevant material. This material may include theories, arguments, and empirical data.

An *analysis* is an independent application of theoretical ideas on empirical material using appropriate social science methods. An analysis includes identifying relevant observable implications of a theory, providing documentation and evaluating the validity of that documentation with regard to theoretical claims, arguments and ideas. The analysis thus typically follows the description.

A *discussion* is a theoretically informed evaluation of the plausibility of a theoretical or empirical statement. Discussions involve balancing arguments for or against the relevant problem or statement. Discussions do not necessarily lead to a final answer, but may conclude by identifying the answer the author finds more plausible or showing how different theoretical perspectives lead to different answers. The discussion thus typically follows the analysis.

Additional guidelines and previous exams are uploaded on Brightspace.

6. Important Deadlines

Essays: There will be three written essays (one in each lecturer’s block). The essay weeks are in **lecture weeks 3, 6, and 10**.

The essays will be discussed in the discussion classes and will receive peer feedback. Please discuss **individual deadlines with your peer feedback group**, so that there is enough time to read each other's essays before the discussion class.

Trial Exam: The trial exam will be uploaded on Brightspace once all material for it has been covered. It can be written at any time after the lecture and discussion class **in lecture week 4**. Make sure to time yourself and set conditions akin to the final 6-hour exam (that is, all course material is allowed, but no internet research).

The deadline for the trial exam is **Wednesday, March 27**. Trial exams are delivered to your discussion class teacher via email. The trial exam will be discussed in the following discussion classes and the teachers will provide individual feedback in the following week for trial exams delivered on time.

[Lecturers and coordinators](#)

Costin Ciobanu (CC), Lecturer

Clara Neupert-Wentz (CNW) (coordinator), Lecturer

Jan Vogler (JV), Lecturer

If you have any practical questions, you are welcome to contact Clara Neupert-Wentz (clara@ps.au.dk).

[Class instructors](#)

Sofia Marini

Mario Bauriegel

Winnie Shiyi Xia

Alexandra Columban

Paula Natalie Bings

Table 2. Organization of the course: Lectures and classes

AUL = Text can be downloaded and printed via AU LIBRARY.

BS = Book chapters uploaded on Brightspace

E-BOOK VIA AUL = Teksten kan downloades og printes via AU LIBRARY

| <i>Class</i> | <i>Topic</i> | <i>Lecture</i> | <i>Pages</i> | <i>Discussion class</i> | <i>Pages</i> |
|--------------|---|---|--------------|--|--------------|
| 1 | Introduction Costin Ciobanu | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hall, Peter A. & Rosemary C.R. Taylor (1996) 'Political science and the three new institutionalisms', <i>Political Studies</i> 44(5): 936-955 (20 pages) (online article). AUL | 20 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Koning, Edward Anthony (2016) 'The three institutionalisms and institutional dynamics: Understanding endogenous and exogenous change', <i>Journal of Public Policy</i>, 36(4): 639-664 (26 pages) (online article). AUL | 26 |
| 2 | Electoral institutions, social cleavages, and party systems; Costin Ciobanu | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sartori, Giovanni. 1990. "A Typology of Party Systems" in Peter Mair (ed.), <i>The West European Party System</i>, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 316-349 (34 pages) BS Boix, Carles. 2007. "Emergence of Parties and Party Systems." in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes (ed.), <i>Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics</i>, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 499-520 (22 pages) E-BOOK via AUL | 70 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Amorim Neto, Octavio and Gary Gox. 1997. "Electoral institutions, cleavage structures and the number of parties." <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 41(1): 149-174 (26 pages) (online article) AUL | 26 |

| | | | | | |
|---|--|---|----|---|----|
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Riker, William H. 1982. "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science." <i>American Political Science Review</i> 76: 753-766 (14 pages) (online article). AUL | | | |
| 3 | Legislatures; Costin Ciobanu | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sieberer, U. (2011) 'The institutional power of Western European parliaments: A multidimensional analysis, <i>West European Politics</i>, 34(4): 731-754 (24 pages) (online article). AUL | 24 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dalton, R.J. (2015) 'Politics in Germany', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. (eds.) <i>Comparative politics today. A world view</i>, 11th ed. Pearson, pp. 279-284, 296, 304-308 + notes 316-317 (14 pages) BS • Schain, M.A. (2015) 'Politics in France', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. <i>Comparative politics today. A world view</i>, 11th ed. Pearson, pp. 223-224, 251-257 + notes 265-267 (12 pages) BS • Lijphart, A. (2012) <i>Patterns of Democracy</i>. New Haven: Yale University, chapter 11, pp. 187-203 (17 pages) E-BOOK via AUL | 43 |

| | | | | | |
|---|--|--|----|--|----|
| 4 | <p>Government regimes and accountability ; Costin Ciobanu</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hellwig, T. & Samuels, D. (2007) ‘Electoral accountability and the variety of democratic regimes’, <i>British Journal of Political Science</i>, 38(1): 65-90 (26 pages) (online article). AUL Fortunato, D., Lin, N., Stevenson, R., and Tromborg, M. (2021) ‘Attributing policy influence under coalition governance’, <i>American Political Science Review</i> 115(1): 252-268 (17 pages) (online article). AUL | 43 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kousser, T. & Ranney, A. (2015) ‘Politics in the United States’, in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. (eds.) <i>Comparative politics today. A world view</i>, 11th ed., Pearson, pp. 713-715, 734-739 + notes 748-749 (11 pages) BS • Trethan, P. (2021, September 02) ‘Powers and duties of the United States Congress. Setting the rules and laying down the law’, ThoughtCo. https://www.thoughtco.com/powers-of-the-united-states-congress-3322280 (2 pages) AUL • Trethan, P. (2020, December 10) ‘The congressional committee system. Who’s doing what?’, ThoughtCo. https://www.thoughtco.com/the-congressional-committee-system-3322274 (2 pages) AUL • Longley, R. (2021, June 3) ‘Presidentially appointed jobs requiring Senate approval. That Senate part can get sticky’, ThoughtCo. | 17 |
|---|--|--|----|--|----|

| | | | | | |
|---|---|--|----|---|----|
| | | | | <p>https://www.thoughtco.com/presidentially-appointed-jobs-requiring-senate-approval-3322227 (2 pages) AUL</p> | |
| 5 | <p>Federalism</p> <p>Clara Neupert-Wentz</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hague, R., M. Harrop, and J. McCormick. (2016) 'Sub-national Government.' <i>Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction</i>. 10th ed. Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 11, pp.181-192 &199 (12 pages) BS • Lijphart, A. (2012) <i>Patterns of Democracy</i>. New Haven: Yale University, chapter 10, pp. 174-186 (13 pages) E-BOOK via AUL | 25 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wlezien, C. & Soroka, S.N. (2011) 'Federalism and public responsiveness to policy', <i>Publius: The Journal of Federalism</i> 41(1): 31-52 (22 pages) (online article). AUL | 22 |
| 6 | <p>Why do states create and use international institutions?</p> <p>Clara Neupert-Wentz</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abbot, K. and D. Snidal (1998) Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i> 42(1): 3-32 (30 pages) (online article) AUL • March, J.G. and J.P. Olesen (1998) | 44 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hafner-Burton, E. M., Mansfield, E. D. and Pevehouse, J. C. W. (2015) "Human Rights Institutions, Sovereignty Costs and Democratization", <i>British Journal of Political Science</i>. 45(1), pp. 1-27 (27 pages) (online article) AUL | 27 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|----|---|----|
| | | The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. <i>International Organization</i> 52(4): 943-956 (14 pages) (excerpt of an online article) AUL | | | |
| 7 | How do international institutions work? Clara Neupert-Wentz | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hawkins, D. et al (2006) Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory. in Hawkins et al (eds) <i>Delegation and Agency in International Organizations</i>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-33. (31 pages) E-BOOK VIA AUL • Barnett, M. & Finnemore, M. (2004) <i>Rules for the World</i>. Cornell Press. Ch. 1 and 2. pp.1-34 (35 pages)E-BOOK VIA AUL | 66 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Margulis, M.E. (2021) Intervention by international organizations in regime complexes. <i>The Review of International Organizations</i>, pp.871-902. (32 pages) (online article) AUL | 32 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|--|----|---|----|
| 8 | <p>IO withdrawal, zombie, and death</p> <p>Clara Neupert-Wentz</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gray, J. (2018) Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations, <i>International Studies Quarterly</i>, 62(1): 1-13 (13 pages) (online article) AUL • Von Borzyskowski, I., Vabulas, F. (2019) Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations?. <i>The Review of International Organizations</i> 14: 335-366 (32 pages) (online article) AUL | 45 | (No readings) | 0 |
| 9 | <p>Theories of European integration</p> <p>Clara Neupert-Wentz</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Niemann, A. & Schmitter, P.C. (2009) 'Neo-functionalism', in A. Wiener & T. Diez (eds.), <i>European integration theory</i>, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 45-65 (21 pages) BS • Kleine, Mareike, and Pollack, Mark (2018) Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics. <i>JCMS: Journal of</i> | 35 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jones, E., Kelemen, R. D. and Meunier, S. (2016) 'Failing Forward? The Euro Crisis and the Incomplete Nature of European Integration', <i>Comparative Political Studies</i>, 49(7), pp. 1010-1034. (25 pages) (online article) AUL • Delpa, Jacques; von Weizsäcker, Jakob (2010) 'The Blue Bond Proposal.' Bruegel Policy Brief. https://www.bruegel.org/2010/05/the-blue- | 28 |

| | | | | | |
|----|--|--|----|--|----|
| | | <p><i>Common Market Studies</i>, 56: 1493 - 1501 & 1506-1510. (14 pages) (online article) AUL</p> | | <p>bond-proposal/ (also shared on Brightspace) (1 page) AUL</p> <p>• Herszenhorn, David M., Bayer, Lili; Montaz, R. (2020) 'The coronavirus recovery plan that von der Leyen built' Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-coronavirus-recovery-plan-summit/ (Excerpt will be shared on Brightspace) (2 pages) AUL</p> | |
| 10 | <p>The Political System of the EU</p> <p>Jan Vogler</p> | <p>• Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2022) <i>The political system of the European Union</i>. Palgrave Macmillan (4th edition), pp. 1-19. BOG</p> <p>• Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D. & Berthold Rittberger (2015) 'The European Union as a system of differentiated integration: interdependence, politicization and differentiation', <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i> 22(6):764-</p> | 37 | <p>• McCormick, J. and Zielonka J. (2021) The European Union: Success or Failure? , In: Zimmermann, H. and Dür, A. <i>Key Controversies in European Integration</i>. pp. 1-17. BS</p> <p>• Bellamy, R. & Lord, C. (2021) How Democratic is the EU, In: Zimmermann, H. and Dür, A. <i>Key Controversies in European Integration</i>. pp. 36-49. BS</p> | 30 |

| | | | | | |
|----|--|--|----|--|----|
| | | 782 (online article). AUL | | | |
| 11 | Executive politics in the EU Jan Vogler | • Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2022) <i>The political system of the European Union</i> . Palgrave Macmillan (4th edition), pp. 25-56. BOG | 31 | • Blom-Hansen, J., & Finke, D. (2020) Reputation and organizational politics: Inside the EU Commission. <i>The Journal of Politics</i> , 82(1), 135-148 (online article) AUL | 14 |
| 12 | Legislative politics in the EU Jan Vogler | • Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2022) <i>The political system of the European Union</i> . Palgrave Macmillan (4th edition), pp. 57-87. BOG | 30 | • Rasmussen, A. & Reh, C. (2013) 'The consequences of concluding codecision early', <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i> 20 (7): 1006-1024 (online article) AUL | 19 |
| 13 | Elections and democracy in the EU Jan Vogler | • Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2022) <i>The political system of the European Union</i> . Palgrave Macmillan (4th edition), pp. 121-173. BOG | 52 | • Hobolt, S. B., & De Vries, C. (2016) Turning against the Union? The impact of the crisis on the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections. <i>Electoral Studies</i> , 44, 504-514 (online article) AUL | 11 |

| | | | | | |
|----|---|--|----|--|-----|
| 14 | <p>Foreign and security politics in the EU</p> <p>Jan Vogler</p> | <p>• Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2022) <i>The political system of the European Union</i>. Palgrave Macmillan (4th edition), pp. 333-356. BOG</p> <p>Häge, F. M. (2020). Allocating political attention in the EU's foreign and security policy: the effect of supranational agenda-setters. <i>European Union Politics</i>, 21(4), 634-656. (online article) AUL</p> | 44 | <p>• Riddervold, M., & Rosén, G. (2016). Trick and treat: How the Commission and the European Parliament exert influence in EU foreign and security policies. <i>Journal of European Integration</i>, 38(6), 687-702. (online article). AUL</p> | 15 |
| 15 | <p>Conclusions and Exam;</p> <p>Costin Ciobanu</p> | No new readings | | No new readings | |
| | | | | Samlet pensum: | 876 |

5. Readings for Political Institutions

Students are expected to acquire the following book:

Hix, S., & Høyland, B. (2022). *The Political System of the European Union* (4th ed.). Bloomsbury UK.

Online-materiale/AU Library:

- Abbot, K. and D. Snidal (1998) Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1): 3-32 (29 pages) (online article).
- Amorim Neto, Octavio and Gary Gox. 1997. "Electoral institutions, cleavage structures and the number of parties. *American Journal of Political Science* 41(1): 149-174 (26 pages) (online article) AUL
- Blom-Hansen, J., & Finke, D. (2020) Reputation and organizational politics: Inside the EU Commission. *The Journal of Politics*, 82(1), 135-148 (online article)
- Delpla, Jacques; von Weizsäcker, Jakob (2010) 'The Blue Bond Proposal.' Bruegel Policy Brief. <https://www.bruegel.org/2010/05/the-blue-bond-proposal/> (also shared on Brightspace) (1 page)
- Fortunato, D., Lin, N., Stevenson, R., and Tromborg, M. (2021) 'Attributing policy influence under coalition governance', *American Political Science Review* 115(1): 252-268 (17 pages).
- Gray, J. (2018) Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations, *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(1): 1-13 (13 pages) (online article)
- Hafner-Burton, E. M., Mansfield, E. D. and Pevehouse, J. C. W. (2015) "Human Rights Institutions, Sovereignty Costs and Democratization", *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(1), pp. 1-27 (27 pages) (online article).
- Hall, Peter A. & Rosemary C.R. Taylor (1996) 'Political science and the three new institutionalisms', *Political Studies*, 44(5): 936-955 (20 pages) (online article).
- Hellwig, T. & Samuels, D. (2007) 'Electoral accountability and the variety of democratic regimes', *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(1): 65-90 (26 pages) (online article).
- Herszenhorn, David M., Bayer, Lili; Momtaz, R. (2020) 'The coronavirus recovery plan that von der Leyen built' Politico. <https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-coronavirus-recovery-plan-summit/> (Excerpt will be shared on Brightspace) (2 pages)
- Hobolt, S. B., & De Vries, C. (2016) Turning against the Union? The impact of the crisis on the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections. *Electoral Studies*, 44, 504-514 (11 pages) (online article).
- Häge, F. M. (2020). Allocating political attention in the EU's foreign and security policy: the effect of supranational agenda-setters. *European Union Politics*, 21(4), 634-656. (online article)

-
-
- Longley, R. (2021, June 3) ‘Presidentially appointed jobs requiring Senate approval. That Senate part can get sticky’, ThoughtCo. <https://www.thoughtco.com/presidentially-appointed-jobs-requiring-senate-approval-3322227> (also shared on Brightspace) (2 pages)
 - Jones, E., Kelemen, R. D. and Meunier, S. (2016) ‘Failing Forward? The Euro Crisis and the Incomplete Nature of European Integration’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(7), pp. 1010-1034. (25 pages) (online article)
 - Kleine, Mareike, and Pollack, Mark (2018) Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56: 1501 &1506-1510. (14 pages) (online article)
 - Koning, Edward Anthony (2016) ‘The three institutionalisms and institutional dynamics: Understanding endogenous and exogenous change’, *Journal of Public Policy*, 36(4): 639-664 (26 pages) (online article). **AUL**
 - March, J. G. and J.P. Olesen (1998) The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. *International Organization*, 52(4): 943-969 read excerpt only: 943-956 (14 pages) (online article).
 - Margulis, M.E. (2021) Intervention by international organizations in regime complexes. *The Review of International Organizations*, 16(4): 871-902 (32 pages) (online article).
 - Rasmussen, A. & Reh, C. (2013) ‘The consequences of concluding codecision early’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(7): 1006-1024 (19 pages) (online article).
 - Riddervold, M., & Rosén, G. (2016). Trick and treat: How the Commission and the European Parliament exert influence in EU foreign and security policies. *Journal of European Integration*, 38(6), 687-702.. (online article).
 - Riker, William H. (1982) “The Two-Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science.” *American Political Science Review* 76: 753-766 (14 pages) (online article).
 - Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D. & Berthold Rittberger (2015) ‘The European Union as a system of differentiated integration: interdependence, politicization and differentiation’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(6):764-782 (19 pages) (online article).
 - Sieberer, U. (2011) ‘The institutional power of Western European parliaments: A multidimensional analysis, *West European Politics*, 34(4): 731-754 (24 pages) (online article).
 - Trethan, P. (2020, December 10) ‘The congressional committee system. Who’s doing what?’, ThoughtCo. <https://www.thoughtco.com/the-congressional-committee-system-3322274> (also shared on Brightspace) (2 pages)

- Trethan, P. (2021, September 02) 'Powers and duties of the United States Congress. Setting the rules and laying down the law', ThoughtCo. <https://www.thoughtco.com/powers-of-the-united-states-congress-3322280> (also shared on Brightspace) (2 pages)
- von Borzyskowski, I., Vabulas, F. (2019) Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations?. *The Review of International Organizations* 14: 335-366 (32 pages) (online article).
- Wlezien, C. & Soroka, S.N. (2011) 'Federalism and public responsiveness to policy', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 41(1): 31-52 (22 pages) (online article).

E-BOOKS VIA AUL

- Barnett, M. & Finnemore, M. (2004) *Rules for the World*. Cornell Press. Ch. 1 and 2. pp. 1-34 (35 pages) **E-BOOK VIA AUL**, <https://www-degruyter-com.ez.statsbiblioteket.dk:12048/document/doi/10.7591/9780801465161/html>
- Boix, Carles (2007) "Emergence of Parties and Party Systems." in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 491-520 (30 pages) **E-BOOK VIA AUL**, <https://www-oxfordhandbooks-com.ez.statsbiblioteket.dk:12048/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566020.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199566020>
- Hawkins, D. et al. (2006) Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory. in Hawkins et al (eds) *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-33. (31 pages) **E-BOOK VIA AUL**, <https://www-cambridge-org.ez.statsbiblioteket.dk:12048/core/books/delegation-and-agency-in-international-organizations/B28F1B57D432A034A83938C776DE1A85>
- Lijphart, A. (2012) *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University, chapter 11, pp. 187-203, chapter 10, pp. 174-186 (30 pages) **E-BOOK VIA AUL**, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ez.statsbiblioteket.dk:12048/lib/asb/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=3421026>

BrightSpace:

- Bellamy, R. & Lord, C. (2021) How Democratic is the EU, In: Zimmermann, H. and Dür, A. *Key Controversies in European Integration*. pp. 36-49 (14 pages) **(BS)**.
- Dalton, R.J. (2015) 'Politics in Germany', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. (eds.) *Comparative Politics Today. A World View, 11th ed.* Pearson, pp. 279-284, 296, 304-308 + notes 316-317 (14 pages) **(BS)**.
- Hague, R., M. Harrop, and J. McCormick. (2016) 'Sub-national Government.' *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*. 10th ed. Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 11, pp. 181-192 & 199 (12 pages) **(BS)**.
- Kousser, T. & Ranney, A. (2015) 'Politics in the United States', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. (eds.) *Comparative Politics Today. A World View, 11th ed.*, Pearson, pp. 713-715, 734-739 + notes 748-749 (11 pages) **(BS)**.
- McCormick, J. and Zielonka J. (2021) The European Union: Success or Failure? , In: Zimmermann, H. and Dür, A. *Key Controversies in European Integration*. pp. 1-17 (17 pages) **(BS)**.
- Niemann, A. & Schmitter, P.C. (2009) 'Neo-functionalism', in A. Wiener & T. Diez (eds.), *European Integration Theory*, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 45-65 (21 pages) **(BS)**.
- Sartori, Giovanni. (1990) "A Typology of Party Systems" in Peter Mair (ed.), *The West European Party System*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 316-349 (34 pages)
- Schain, M.A. (2015) 'Politics in France', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. *Comparative Politics Today. A World View, 11th ed.* Pearson, pp. 223-224, 251-257 + notes 265-267 (12 pages) **(BS)**.

Total number of pages: 876