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EMPIRES, STATE BUILDING, AND LONG-TERM LEGACIES IN BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION: THE CASE OF POLAND

Introduction

In order to understand the current political-administrative organization of states around the globe, one needs to first examine these countries' history.¹ The age of imperialism in particular has left a lasting imprint on societies in all world regions.² Focusing on developments in Eastern Europe, this chapter aims to answer the following question: Did the historical state building processes through three empires — Austria, Prussia, and Russia — in the territories of present-day Poland have long-term consequences for the country's administrative culture and organization? Poland is an ideal case for studying such bureaucratic legacies because, throughout the *long nineteenth century*, these three »very different Empires«³ ruled its territories and imposed their distinct administrative systems.

- ¹ This chapter is an abbreviated and updated version of the article »Imperial Rule, the Imposition of Bureaucratic Institutions, and their Long-Term Legacies« (World Politics 71/4, October 2019, 806–863). Reprinted with permission of Cambridge University Press. Copyright © 2019 Trustees of Princeton University. The maps are partly based on © EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries. I thank Mat McCubbins, Georg Vanberg, Eddy Malesky, Erik Wibbels, Jos Raadschelders, and Paweł Charasz for their support. Helpful comments or advice have been provided numerous additional people listed in the original article. I am also thankful to the experts who participated in interviews and to participants of seminars at various universities.
- ² *La Porta, Rafael/Lopez-De-Silanes, Florencio/Shleifer, Andrei/Vishny, Robert W.*: Legal Determinants of External Finance. In: The Journal of Finance 52/3 (1997), 1131–1150; *Acemoglu, Daron/Johnson, Simon/Robinson, James A.*: The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development. An Empirical Investigation. In: The American Economic Review 91/5 (2001), 1369–1401; *Gerring, John/Ziblatt, Daniel/Van Gorp, Johan/Arévalo, Julián*: An institutional theory of direct and indirect rule. In: World Politics 63/3 (2011), 377–433; *Ali, Merima/Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge/Jiang, Boqian/Shifa, Abdulaziz B.*: Colonial Legacy, State-Building and the Salience of Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: The Economic Journal 129/619 (2019), 1048–1081. For a broad overview of the historical persistence literature, including contributions on imperial legacies, see *Cirone, Alexandra/Pepinsky, Thomas B.*: Historical Persistence. In: Annual Review of Political Science 25 (2022).
- ³ *Lukowski, Jerzy/Zawadzki, Hubert*: A concise history of Poland. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006, 211.

This also includes the period 1850–1918, which was a crucial time for the development of modern bureaucracies.⁴

Despite the long tradition of research on imperial legacies in political economy, few scholars have looked at imperial long-term effects on *bureaucratic* institutions. This is surprising because bureaucracies are one of the most powerful tools for controlling people.⁵ Local administrations are also key to policy implementation.⁶ Existing studies often do not measure bureaucratic characteristics directly, but instead focus on perceptions⁷ or social, political, and economic consequences thereof, including the quality of public goods.⁸

Beyond answering the specific research question introduced above, this chapter has a broader purpose. In the last two decades, political scientists have collected much data and presented rigorous statistical analyses to examine the multi-faceted legacies of empires.⁹ As impressive as their analyses are, such endeavors would further profit from a continuous dialogue with the discipline of

⁴ Raadschelders, J. C. N./Rutgers, Mark R.: The evolution of civil service systems. In: Bekke, Hans A. G. M./Perry, James L./Toonen, Theo A. (Eds.): *Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective*. Bloomington/IN 1996, 67–99; Carpenter, Daniel P.: *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928*. Princeton/NJ 2001.

⁵ Eisenstadt, Shmuel N.: *The Political Systems of Empires*. New Brunswick/NJ 1993.

⁶ Dasgupta, Aditya/Kapur, Devesh: The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India. In: *American Political Science Review* 114/4 (2020), 1316–1334.

⁷ Becker, Sascha O./Boeckh, Katrin/Hainz, Christa/Woessmann, Ludger: The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy. In: *The Economic Journal* 126/590 (2016), 40–74.

⁸ Lee, Alexander/Schultz, Kenneth A.: Comparing British and French Colonial Legacies: A Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon. In: *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7/4 (2012), 365–410.

⁹ Paik, Christopher/Vechbanyongratana, Jessica: Path to Centralization and Development: Evidence from Siam. In: *World Politics* 71/2 (2019), 289–331; Nathan, Noah L.: Electoral Consequences of Colonial Invention. Brokers, Chiefs, and Distribution in Northern Ghana. In: *World Politics* 71/3 (2019), 417–456; Paine, Jack: Democratic Contradictions in European Settler Colonies. In: *World Politics* 71/3 (2019), 542–585; Buzan, Barry/Lawson, George: *The Global Transformation. The Nineteenth Century and the Making of Modern International Relations*. In: *International Studies Quarterly* 57/3 (2013), 620–634; Lankina, Tomila/Getachew, Lullit: Mission or Empire, Word or Sword? The Human Capital Legacy in Postcolonial Democratic Development. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 56/2 (2012), 465–483; Mendelski, Martin/Libman, Alexander: Demand for Litigation in the Absence of Traditions of Rule of Law: An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies in Romania. In: *Constitutional Political Economy* 25/2 (2014), 177–206; Pierskalla, Jan/Schultz, Anna/Wibbels, Erik: Order, Distance, and Local Development over the Long-Run. In: *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 12/4 (2017), 375–404. Some scholars emphasize the importance of pre-colonial institutions. See, for instance, Wilfahrt, Martha: Precolonial Legacies and Institutional Congruence in Public Goods Delivery. Evidence from Decentralized West Africa. In: *World Politics* 70/2 (2018), 239–274. Yet in the specific case of

history. Historians are deeply familiar with the complex relationship of imperialism, state building, and political development. The chapter at hand represents a contribution to this interdisciplinary dialogue by (1) drawing on scholarly work in (administrative) history, (2) having significantly benefited from advice by historians, and (3) being a part of an ongoing conversation between the two disciplines.



Figure 1: Imperial Partition of Poland 1815–1914. This map is partly based on the following source: © EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries, at URL: <http://www.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/geodata/reference-data/administrative-units-statistical-units>.

A number of related studies already assess various imperial legacies in Poland, but none of them is focused on bureaucracy. Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya find several discontinuities at the imperial borders. Specifically, the formerly Prussian parts experience stronger support for anti-communist parties, whereas

Poland, the imperial borders under consideration did not systematically separate areas with diverging institutions, and 123 years of foreign rule led to the comprehensive replacement of previous administrative structures.

people in the formerly Austrian parts vote for more conservative and religious parties compared to voting behavior in the formerly Russian area.¹⁰ Similarly, Bukowski finds that, in the vicinity of the historical boundaries, 6th-grade and 9th-grade students in the Austrian partition score significantly higher on standardized tests than students in the Russian partition.¹¹ Also, Kantorowicz identifies a clear difference in property taxes across past imperial borders.¹² Moreover, Ekiert and Hanson analyze communist legacies in Poland and other Eastern European states,¹³ and Pop-Eleches and Tucker discuss different pathways through which those legacies perpetuate.¹⁴ Furthermore, Cramsey and Wittenberg show that Polish elites forcefully *polonized* minority groups in the interwar period,¹⁵ and Bernhard investigates the origins of the Polish democratic opposition under socialism.¹⁶ Additional studies on historical legacies include a contribution by Nalepa and Pop-Eleches, who investigate the effects of population resettlements on the ability of the Communist regime to infiltrate the Catholic church,¹⁷ and research by Charnysh on (1) the influence of historical antisemitism on attitudes toward the EU¹⁸ as well as (2) population displacements after World War Two.¹⁹ Finally, von Hirschhausen and Bint as well as von Hirschhausen and colleagues introduce the concept of »phantom

¹⁰ Grosfeld, Irena/Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina: Cultural vs. Economic Legacies of Empires. Evidence from the Partition of Poland. In: *Journal of Comparative Economics* 43/1 (2015), 55–75.

¹¹ Bukowski, Paweł: How history matters for student performance. Lessons from the Partitions of Poland. In: *Journal of Comparative Economics* 47/1 (2019), 136–175.

¹² Kantorowicz, Jarosław: Fiscal Policy and the Long Shadows of History. In: *Journal of Historical Political Economy* 2/1 (2022), 1–28.

¹³ Ekiert, Grzegorz/Hanson, Stephen: *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule*. Cambridge 2003.

¹⁴ Pop-Eleches, Grigore/Tucker, Joshua A.: Communism's Shadow. Postcommunist Legacies, Values, and Behavior. In: *Comparative Politics* 43/4 (2011), 379–408.

¹⁵ Cramsey, Sarah A./Wittenberg, Jason: Timing Is Everything. Changing Norms of Minority Rights and the Making of a Polish Nation-State. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 49/11 (2016), 1480–1512.

¹⁶ Bernhard, Michael H.: *The Origins of Democratization in Poland. Workers, Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics, 1976–1980*. New York 1993.

¹⁷ Nalepa, Monika/Pop-Eleches, Grigore: *Authoritarian Institutional Infiltration. Causes and Consequences*. Working Paper, URL: <https://www.monikanalepa.com/uploads/6/6/3/1/66318923/finalauthoritarianinstitutionalinfiltrationapril5.pdf>, accessed 27 July 2020. For a thematically related study, see Hager, Anselm/Krakowski, Krzysztof: Does State Repression Spark Protests? Evidence from Secret Police Surveillance in Communist Poland. In: *American Political Science Review* (2021).

¹⁸ Charnysh, Volha: Historical Legacies of Interethnic Competition. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 48/13 (2015), 1711–1745.

¹⁹ Charnysh, Volha: Diversity, Institutions, and Economic Outcomes. Post-WWII Displacement in Poland. In: *American Political Science Review* 113/2 (2019), 423–441.

borders«, including in Poland.²⁰ Beyond the large body of studies on historical legacies in Poland, an overview of the related (but broader) literature on borderlands is provided by Braun and Kienitz.²¹

This chapter proceeds as follows: First, I provide an overview of imperial state building processes in Poland and generate multiple hypothesis. Then, I investigate intertemporal transmission mechanisms. Finally, I discuss my empirical strategy and discuss the results.

Historical Background: The Case of Divided Poland

The Prussian Administrative State

In the nineteenth century, the Prussian administrative state was characterized by high levels of efficiency and meritocracy.²² A rigorous legal framework governed its operation, a law degree was required for public service, competitive examinations were held, and an independent commission had to approve all applicants.²³ Thus, the Prussian bureaucracy was among the most modern in the world²⁴ and it enjoyed a reputation of »incorruptibility«. ²⁵ In short, Prussia's bureaucracy was »extremely well organised and efficient«. ²⁶

²⁰ *Hirschhausen, Béatrice von/Grandits, Hannes/Kraft, Claudia/Müller, Dietmar/Serrier, Thomas: Phantom Borders in Eastern Europe. A New Concept for Regional Research. In: Slavic Review 78/2 (2019), 368–389; Hirschhausen, Béatrice von/Bint, Natalie: The Lessons of Phantom Borders. The Vestiges of the Past Come (Also) from the Future. In: L'Espace géographique 46/2 (2017), 97–105.*

²¹ *Braun, Robert/Kienitz, Otto: Comparative Politics in Borderlands. Actors, Identities, and Strategies. In: Annual Review of Political Science 25 (2022).*

²² *Bleek, Wilhelm: Von der Kameralausbildung zum Juristenprivileg. Studium, Prüfung und Ausbildung der höheren Beamten des allgemeinen Verwaltungsdienstes in Deutschland im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert. Berlin 1972; Dorn, Walter L.: The Prussian Bureaucracy in the Eighteenth Century. In: Political Science Quarterly 46/3 (1931), 403–423.*

²³ *Bleek: Von der Kameralausbildung zum Juristenprivileg; Mann, Michael: The Sources of Social Power. Vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States 1760–1914. Cambridge 1993, 449–450; Raphael, Lutz: Recht und Ordnung. Herrschaft durch Verwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt am Main 2000, 53–57.*

²⁴ *Bleek: Von der Kameralausbildung zum Juristenprivileg; Dorn: The Prussian Bureaucracy in the Eighteenth Century; Raphael: Recht und Ordnung; Vogler, Jan P.: The Political Economy of Public Bureaucracy. The Emergence of Modern Administrative Organizations. Working Paper (2020), URL: http://www.janvogler.net/PE_of_Bureaucracy.pdf, accessed 27 July 2020; Wunder, Bernd: Geschichte der Bürokratie in Deutschland. Berlin 1986, 21–22.*

²⁵ *Davies, Norman: God's Playground. A History of Poland. Vol. II: 1795 to the Present. Oxford 2005, 85.*

²⁶ *Prazmowska, Anita J.: A History of Poland. Basingstoke 2011, 131.*

Beginning in 1794, Prussian administrative structures, including Prussian laws, were imposed on Poland's western territories.²⁷ After 1815, limited autonomy was given to the province of Posen (Poznań),²⁸ including the hiring of Polish administrators.²⁹ But even Posen was eventually integrated into Prussia. In 1876, a new policy of *germanization* began, imposing German legal and cultural institutions and making German the official language of the administration, the courts, and most schools.³⁰

The Austrian Administrative State

In the eighteenth century, Austria implemented a series of reforms aimed at creating a more efficient administration.³¹ The result was that it had »a relatively well-functioning, respected bureaucracy«. ³² Taylor describes the bureaucracy as hardworking and honest but also points out that it suffered from the production of mountains of paper and other such flaws common to most modern administrations.³³ Although reforms stalled in the nineteenth century and corruption could not be entirely eliminated,³⁴ the bureaucracy was comparatively meritocratic, offering positions and promotions to non-noble candidates.³⁵ Accordingly, the Habsburg bureaucracy was relatively efficient but also had certain weaknesses.³⁶

In the 1780s and 1790s, Austria introduced its administration to its Galician territories,³⁷ also implementing censorship and repression.³⁸ Initially, Austria made few concessions to the Poles and its bureaucracy put a heavy tax burden

²⁷ *Hoensch*, Jörg Konrad: *Geschichte Polens*. Stuttgart 1990, 181; *Lukowski/Zawadzki*: *A Concise History of Poland*, 137; *Prazmowska*: *A history of Poland*, 131; *Wandycz*, Piotr S.: *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918*. Seattle/WA 1975, 14–15.

²⁸ *Biskupski*, Mieczysław B.: *The History of Poland*. Westport/CT 2000, 26; *Lukowski/Zawadzki*: *A Concise History of Poland*, 155; *Wandycz*: *The Lands of Partitioned Poland*, 65–69.

²⁹ *Heyde*, Jürgen: *Geschichte Polens*. Munich 2006, 59.

³⁰ *Heyde*: *Geschichte Polens*, 73; *Lukowski/Zawadzki*: *A Concise History of Poland*, 183–184; *Prazmowska*: *A history of Poland*, 154–155.

³¹ *Kann*, Robert A.: *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526–1918*. Berkeley/CA 1974, 174–178, 183–187; *Raphael*: *Recht und Ordnung*, 58.

³² *Becker/Boeckh/Hainz/Woessmann*: *The Empire Is Dead*, 41.

³³ *Taylor*, Alan John Percivale: *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809–1918. A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary*. London 1948, 38.

³⁴ *Raphael*: *Recht und Ordnung*, 58–59.

³⁵ *Judson*, Pieter M.: *The Habsburg Empire. A New History*. Cambridge/MA 2016, 58–61.

³⁶ *Deak*, John: *Forging a Multinational State. State Making in Imperial Austria from the Enlightenment to the First World War*. Stanford/CA 2015.

³⁷ *Lukowski/Zawadzki*: *A concise history of Poland*, 137; *Wandycz*: *The Lands of Partitioned Poland*, 12.

³⁸ *Davies*: *God's Playground. A History of Poland*. Vol. II, 104; *Prazmowska*: *A History of Poland*, 132.

on the region.³⁹ Despite initially high levels of repression, not all Austrian bureaucrats had an antagonistic relationship with the population—instead, some developed strong ties to local elites.⁴⁰ Also, local administrations in the pre-March era often functioned as intermediaries between rural populations and manors/estate ownerships.⁴¹ The 1848 revolution then led to a first set of progressive reforms.⁴² Moreover, following defeats of Austria in 1859 and 1866,⁴³ significant levels of self-governance by the Poles were allowed,⁴⁴ including the local control of bureaucracies and the presence of Galician representatives in Vienna.⁴⁵ Consequently, Galicia enjoyed substantially higher levels of decentralized administrative control, which was appreciated by the Poles.⁴⁶

The Russian Administrative State

In direct comparison with Austria and Prussia, Russia had a highly inefficient public administration.⁴⁷ Both social selectivity and patronage were much more predominant than in Prussia or Austria, while aspects of meritocratic recruitment were either underdeveloped or non-existent. Thus, levels of meritocracy and efficiency were significantly lower than in the Prussian and Austrian bureaucracies, whereas corruption and arbitrariness were omnipresent.⁴⁸ Moreover, the hierarchical, military-like administrative structures systematically

³⁹ *Lukowski/Zawadzki*: A concise history of Poland, 156; *Wandycz*: The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 71.

⁴⁰ *Vushko*, Iryna: The Politics of Cultural Retreat. Imperial Bureaucracy in Austrian Galicia, 1772–1867. New Haven/CT 2015.

⁴¹ *Deak*: Forging a Multinational State; *Klabouch*, Jiří: Die Lokalverwaltung in Cisleithanien. In: *Wandruszka*, Adam/*Urbanitsch*, Peter (Eds.): Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918. Vol. 2: Verwaltung und Rechtswesen. Vienna 1975, 270–305.

⁴² *Prazmowska*: A History of Poland, 144.

⁴³ *Kennedy*, Paul: The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. London 1988, 163–166.

⁴⁴ *Biskupski*: The history of Poland, 28; *Borodziej*, Włodzimierz: Geschichte Polens im 20. Jahrhundert. Munich 2010, 14; *Davies*: God's Playground. A History of Poland. Volume II, 109–111; *Lukowski/Zawadzki*: A Concise History of Poland, 184–185; *Prazmowska*: A History of Poland, 155–157.

⁴⁵ *Borodziej*: Geschichte Polens im 20. Jahrhundert, 37; *Grosfeld/Zhuravskaya*: Cultural vs. Economic Legacies of Empires, 56; *Roszkowski*, Wojciech: The Reconstruction of the Government and State Apparatus in the Second Polish Republic. In: *Latawski*, Paul (ed.): The Reconstruction of Poland, 1914–23. New York/NY 1992, 158–177, here 159–160; *Vushko*: The Politics of Cultural Retreat.

⁴⁶ *Kennedy*: The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 217.

⁴⁷ *Davies*: God's Playground. A History of Poland: Vol. II, chapter 2; *Grosfeld/Zhuravskaya*: Cultural vs. Economic Legacies of Empires, 56; *Raphael*: Recht und Ordnung, 67–75.

⁴⁸ *Baberowski*, Jörg: Der rote Terror. Die Geschichte des Stalinismus. Frankfurt am Main 2014, 17–25; *Davies*: God's Playground. A History of Poland. Vol. II, chapter 2; *Raphael*: Recht und Ordnung, 67–71, 74–75.

undermined personal initiative,⁴⁹ and »[e]specially at the lower levels, the bureaucracy was radiantly corrupt«. ⁵⁰ In general, »Russia was [...] characterized by the least efficient administrative apparatus [...] of the three empires«. ⁵¹

When Russia first acquired territory in northeastern Poland in 1772 — and similarly in 1796 — it created new administrative provinces called »gubernias«. ⁵² But due to a »shortage of Russian administrators« and the absence of »a body of codified laws« ⁵³ — associated with an inability to build a modern public administration — Russia was initially unable to pursue a policy of *rus-sification*. ⁵⁴ This lack of administrative capacity also meant that the extent and quality of public goods was severely restricted compared to Prussia or Austria. ⁵⁵ At first, the Congress Kingdom of Poland (founded after 1815) enjoyed administrative autonomy but this status ended with an uprising in 1830/31, leading to a period of repression. ⁵⁶ Russia maintained the Kingdom as an administrative unit of its core state but simultaneously »abolished the constitution, the Sejm [parliament] and the Polish army«. ⁵⁷ This was a major defeat to Polish desires for self-governance. Subsequently, the Russian army policed Poland to prevent another military uprising. ⁵⁸

Measuring Efficiency and Meritocracy

Accordingly, stark differences in both efficiency and meritocracy can be observed in the historical administrations of Prussia, Austria, and Russia. This section focuses on how we can measure these concepts in the present day to examine if historical legacies persist.

Measuring Efficiency: When measuring efficiency, we can focus on input or output factors. In the case of present-day Polish communes (*gmina*), a focus on input factors is more appropriate for the following reasons: With the exception of county-level (*powiat*) cities, municipalities in the territory of present-

⁴⁹ *Davies*: God's Playground. A History of Poland. Vol. II, 70–71.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁵¹ *Grosfeld/Zhuravskaya*: Cultural vs. Economic Legacies of Empires, 56.

⁵² *Davies*: God's Playground. A History of Poland. Vol. II, 65; *Wandycz*: The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 18.

⁵³ *Prazmowska*: A History of Poland, 133.

⁵⁴ *Lukowski/Zawadzki*: A Concise History of Poland, 136–137.

⁵⁵ *Grosfeld/Zhuravskaya*: Cultural vs. Economic Legacies of Empires, 60. For an overview of related developments after 1864, see *Rolf*, Malte: Imperiale Herrschaft im Weichsel-land. Das Königreich Polen im Russischen Imperium 1864–1915. Berlin 2015.

⁵⁶ *Biskupski*: The History of Poland, 24–26; *Borodziej*: Geschichte Polens im 20. Jahrhundert, 13–14; *Heyde*: Geschichte Polens, 57–62; *Lukowski/Zawadzki*: A Concise History of Poland, 147–150, 157–163; *Prazmowska*: A History of Poland, 137–142; *Wandycz*: The Lands of Partitioned Poland, chapter 6.

⁵⁷ *Lukowski/Zawadzki*: A Concise History of Poland, 162.

⁵⁸ *Kennedy*: The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 172.

day Poland have the same legally required set of outputs (organizational tasks) in terms of public goods and services. Those include, for example, waste management, the maintenance of roads, and fire protection. County-level cities provide additional services to citizens, such as issuing vehicle registration certificates. Given the uniformity of expected outputs that public administrations are required to deliver, I use the number of public administrators per 1,000 inhabitants as a measure of inputs (of human resources). From an input-centered perspective, a more efficient public administration needs fewer employees to fulfill the standard set of organizational tasks.

Measuring Meritocracy: In line with the argument that meritocracy has a strong impact on bureaucratic efficiency,⁵⁹ several studies imply that larger (or less efficient) bureaucracies could also suffer from patronage recruitment.⁶⁰ But how can I more directly measure meritocracy? Meritocracy is associated with the level of selectivity in the application process. Therefore, I use the number of applicants relative to the number of job openings at the level of the clerk (*urzędnik*). More candidates per job increase the competitiveness/selectivity of the recruitment procedure. This measurement reflects both (1) the efforts of the public administration to find qualified candidates and (2) the attractiveness of working there. In places where efforts to find qualified candidates are low and in places where the public administration is seen as inefficient/not prestigious, it attracts fewer candidates.

Summary and Hypotheses

The low levels of meritocracy and efficiency in the Russian administration led to a comparably low level of legitimacy of Russian institutions. This likely had a negative impact on citizen perceptions and the self-selection of qualified applicants into administrative jobs, potentially resulting in long-term (self-reinforcing) decreases in bureaucratic efficiency.

Hypotheses 1 and 2: Compared to communes in the formerly Russian parts, we expect the local public administrations in the formerly Austrian or Prussian

⁵⁹ *Evans, Peter B./Rauch, James E.: Bureaucracy and Growth. A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of »Weberian« State Structures on Economic Growth. In: American Sociological Review 64/5 (1999), 748–765; Dahlström, Carl/Lapuente, Victor/Teorell, Jan: The Merit of Meritocratization. Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption. In: Political Research Quarterly 65/3 (2012), 656–668.*

⁶⁰ *Calvo, Ernesto/Murillo, Maria Victoria: Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market. In: American Journal of Political Science 48/4 (2004), 742–757; Diaz, Juan José: Public Sector Downsizing. In: Coudouel, Aline/Paternostro, Stefano (eds.): Analyzing the Distributional Impact of Reforms. A Practitioners' Guide to Pension, Health, Labor Markets, Public Sector Downsizing, Taxation, Decentralization and Macroeconomic Modeling. Vol. 2: The World Bank. Washington, D. C. 2006, 213–254, here 217; Brierley, Sarah: Combining Patronage and Merit in Public Sector Recruitment. In: The Journal of Politics 83/1 (2020), 182–197.*

parts of Poland to have fewer public employees per 1,000 inhabitants (indicating higher levels of efficiency) (H1) and to have a larger pool of applicants for administrative jobs (indicating higher levels of meritocracy) (H2).

Furthermore, when compared to Prussia, the higher levels of local autonomy and decentralization in the Austrian administration led to increases in the perceived legitimacy of Austrian institutions by the Poles. Consequently, interactions between bureaucrats and citizens were less antagonistic, which may have had beneficial long-term consequences for the public's view of bureaucracies and the self-selection of qualified applicants into administrative jobs, perpetuating bureaucratic efficiency.

Hypotheses 3 and 4: Compared to communes in the formerly Prussian parts, we expect the local public administrations in the formerly Austrian parts of Poland to have fewer public employees per 1,000 inhabitants (indicating higher levels of efficiency) (H3) and to have a larger pool of applicants for administrative jobs (indicating higher levels of meritocracy) (H4).

Mechanisms of Intertemporal Transmission

Which specific mechanisms of intertemporal transmission could be responsible for persistent imperial legacies in Poland's public administration?

When considering the historical period of interwar Poland (1918–1939), it is important to note that the nascent Polish state was slow to develop a new and unified legal framework to govern its public administration. Despite a process of (formal) unification in administrative procedures, for several years, the former partitions of Poland maintained distinct legal-administrative traditions — based primarily on the former empires' systems.⁶¹ This means that the quasi-experimental »treatment« of distinct historical administrative systems persisted well into the 1920s.

Because human capital and administrative culture also matter for bureaucratic organization, a relevant fact is that there was significant continuity in personnel after the disintegration of the empires. Historical statistics from the year 1923 reveal that, in each of the partitions, approximately one third or more of all civil servants had been working at the public administration since the period of external rule. Specifically, the Central Statistical Office of Poland provided the following numbers on civil servants who had been working at the public administration for 6 or more years in 1923: 32.7 percent of civil servants

⁶¹ *Tarnowska, Anna: Z dziejów unifikacji administracji II Rzeczypospolitej* [From the History of Unification of the Administration in the Second Republic of Poland]. Toruń 2012; *Tarnowska, Anna: Podstawy prawne skarbowości samorz ą dowejw II RP* [The Legal Basis of the Treasury System of Local Governments in the Second Republic of Poland]. In: *Prawo Budżetowe Państwa i Samorz ą du* 1/2 (2013), 41–59.

in »Central Poland« (formerly under control of Russia), 32.1 percent in »Western Poland« (formerly under the control of Prussia), and 70.3 percent in »Southern Poland« (formerly under the control of Austria).⁶² Accordingly, both formal and informal aspects of bureaucratic organization persisted into the 1920s, extending the distinct administrative systems into the Second Polish Republic and contributing to the perspective that administrative culture was a key aspect of intertemporal stability in bureaucratic organization.

Since Poland did not have a unified legal framework in 1923, a comparison of the relative number of employees per capita is less meaningful than in the subsequent communist and post-communist periods. But if we simultaneously compare differences in outputs, that is, public goods and services, such an analysis can reveal important patterns. Most importantly, even though the Russian administrative state had been significantly less extensive in the provision of public goods and services,⁶³ historical statistics about the number of province (voivodeship) and county administrators show that the former Russian partition approximated the former Austrian and Prussian partitions in personnel size. While Austria and Prussia had provided *vastly* more outputs,⁶⁴ in the years after the disintegration of the empires there was only a small difference between the formerly Russian parts of »Central Poland« — with an average of 0.16 administrators (per 1,000 inhabitants) — and the formerly Austrian and Prussian partitions — with 0.25 and 0.29, respectively.⁶⁵

Even though World War Two and the transition to communism were highly disruptive to Poland's political system, the latter also meant a homogenization of legal-administrative frameworks across the country. If path dependence in bureaucratic organization holds, the suggested patterns in personnel size — as a measure for administrative efficiency — should be fully observable in this period due to a streamlining of expected outputs.

Specific numbers regarding the employees of local public administrations are available for the year 1968.⁶⁶ When combined with population statistics,⁶⁷

⁶² Funkcjonariusze państwowej służby cywilnej. Wyniki spisu ze stycznia 1923 roku [Functionaries of the State Civil Service: The Results of the January 1923 Census]. Ed. *Główny Urząd Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*. Warsaw 1925, 1.

⁶³ *Grosfeld/Zhuravskaya: Cultural vs. Economic Legacies of Empires*, 60.

⁶⁴ For example, with respect to both infrastructure (in terms of the paved roads per capita) and medical services (in terms of the number of doctors per capita), provision was much less extensive in the Russian partition (among many other public goods and services). See *Kumaniecki, K./Krzyżanowski, A.: Statystyka Polski [Statistics of Poland]*. Kraków 1915, 228–230, 253–258.

⁶⁵ *Gawryszewski, Andrzej: Ludność Polski w XX wieku [The Population of Poland in the Twentieth Century]*. Warsaw 2005, 82; *Funkcjonariusze państwowej służby cywilnej*, 26.

⁶⁶ *Rocznik Statystyczny Pracy 1945–1968 [Yearbook of Labor Statistics 1945–1968]*. Ed. *Główny Urząd Statystyczny*. Warsaw 1970, 114–115.

⁶⁷ *Rocznik Statystyczny Pracy 1971 [Yearbook of Statistics 1971]*. Ed. *Główny Urząd Statystyczny*. Warsaw 1972, 18–44.

we observe the following patterns: The province Krakowskie, which overlaps with the former Austrian partition, had a relatively low number of 1.58 local public administrators per 1,000 inhabitants. Similarly, the province Katowickie, which was split between all three empires, with a substantial Austrian part, had 1.51 local administrators. Only the mostly Austrian province Rzeszowskie is an outlier with 2.04 administrators, leading to an average of 1.71 in these three territories. The provinces that overlapped with the Prussian partition to the greatest extent had an average value of 1.77. Finally, the provinces that primarily overlapped with the Russian partition had an average of 1.93 administrators. These significant relative differences, which can be observed despite a unification in *formal* institutions, are mostly in line with my expectations. They also provide support for the view that persisting differences in *informal* institutions are constitutive of divergence in bureaucratic efficiency. Considering the previous operationalization, the unification of the legal frameworks and the associated streamlining of expected outputs mean that we can more directly compare the number of local administrators as a possible measure of bureaucratic efficiency. Accordingly, in an input/output framework of efficiency, the administrations in the formerly Russian partition perform substantially below their counterparts in the communist period as well.

Which concrete mechanisms related to informal institutions could be responsible for the intertemporal stability of administrative organization in Poland? Theoretically, at least two possible channels of transmission exist.

First, the intergenerational transmission of cultural values (historically imposed by the public administrations of the three powers) could have a persistent impact on administrative norms and behavior.⁶⁸ Second, historically formed attitudes toward the state may influence the relationship of individuals with public authorities.⁶⁹ Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci argue that such historically formed views of the state can constitute a long-term equilibrium and have a decisive impact on state-citizen interactions, specifically in terms of clientelism.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Cf. Grosfeld/Zhuravskaya: Cultural vs. Economic Legacies of Empires; Alesina, Alberto/Giuliano, Paola: Culture and institutions. In: *Journal of Economic Literature* 53/4 (2015), 898–944.

⁶⁹ Cf. Bräutigam, Deborah/Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge/Moore, Mick: *Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries. Capacity and Consent.* Cambridge 2008; Karim, Sabrina: *Relational State Building in Areas of Limited Statehood. Experimental Evidence on the Attitudes of the Police.* In: *American Political Science Review* 114/2 (2020), 536–551; Levi, Margaret: *Of Rule and Revenue.* Berkeley/CA 1989; Vogler, Jan P.: *The Entanglement of Public Bureaucratic Institutions. Their Interactions with Society, Culture, Politics, and the Economy.* In: Boudreaux, Donald J./Coyne, Christopher J./Herzberg, Bobbi (Eds.): *Interdisciplinary Studies of the Political Order. New Applications of Public Choice Theory.* Lanham/MD 2019, 99–129.

⁷⁰ Bustikova, Lenka/Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina: *Patronage, Trust, and State Capacity: The Historical Trajectories of Clientelism.* In: *World Politics* 69/2 (2017), 277–326.

Additionally, a robust positive perception of public bureaucracies could persistently lead to the self-selection of more highly qualified applicants, creating a self-reinforcing dynamic of higher efficiency and improved public attitudes.⁷¹

Comprehensive empirical evidence demonstrates that cultural legacies of imperial rule persisted throughout the communist period. Hryniewicz shows that, after the disintegration of the communist regime, people in western and southern territories of Poland, which had primarily belonged to Prussia and Austria, had substantially stronger beliefs in meritocracy and the market as an allocation mechanism. Also, people in territories that had primarily belonged to the Russian partition were more likely to view work as a source of financial security rather than as a personal achievement, further supporting the view that there are significant, historically rooted differences in cultural norms and values across the former partitions.⁷² Similarly, Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya find that democratic capital and beliefs in decentralized governance are greatest in the formerly Habsburg parts.⁷³

These substantial regional differences in norms support the position that persistence in culture is likely a driving force in the path dependence of administrative organization, connecting the time of imperial rule to subsequent periods. Stronger beliefs in the market and meritocracy in Poland's west and south make recruitment based on patronage and personal connections less likely. Moreover, since corruption had been a key aspect of regional administrative culture in the Russian partition, it is possible to have amplified corrupt behavior by officials both in the Second Polish Republic and under communism.

Furthermore, Majcherkiewicz argues that »[present-day] attitudes [toward the public administration] [...] were formed during the long Partition period that began in 1795 and ended in 1918«. ⁷⁴ Since there were significant differences in efficiency, corruption, and legitimacy between the bureaucracies of the three occupying powers, those views likely differ across the partitions. In this respect, Becker and colleagues present empirical evidence that there is path dependence in perceptions of state institutions across the historical Habsburg

⁷¹ For a similar argument (of self-reinforcing dynamics in perceptions and actual efficiency) related to the American context, see *Lerman, Amy E.: Good Enough for Government Work: The Public Reputation Crisis in America (And What We Can Do to Fix It)*. Chicago/IL 2019.

⁷² *Hryniewicz, J. T.: Czynniki rozwoju regionalnego [Factors of regional development]*. In: *Jalowiecki, B. (Ed.): Oblicza polskich regionów [Faces of the regions of Poland]*. Warsaw 1996, 89–129; *Zukowski, Ryszard: Historical Path Dependence, Institutional Persistence, and Transition to Market Economy. The Case of Poland*. In: *International Journal of Social Economics* 31/10 (2004), 955–973.

⁷³ *Grosfeld/Zhuravskaya: Cultural vs. Economic Legacies of Empires*.

⁷⁴ *Majcherkiewicz, Tatiana: Civil Service Reform in Poland. The Influence of Path Dependence*. In: *Killian, Jerri/Eklund, Niklas (Eds.): Handbook of Administrative Reform — An International Perspective*. Boca Raton/FL 2008, 139–157, here 140.

border, including in Poland.⁷⁵ Persisting positive views of the public administration could lead to the self-selection of more and more highly qualified candidates into the applicant pool, also reinforcing higher levels of efficiency.

Searching for the Legacies of Imperial Bureaucracies: The Empirical Test

I conduct an empirical analysis at the level of the commune. A commune is comparable a municipality — a more common term in countries in which English is the official language. For this purpose, I have used a database of Polish government institutions to identify as many public administrations at the commune level as possible.⁷⁶

My central data collection effort was an electronic survey on various aspects of bureaucratic efficiency and performance. Questions were on the size of the public administration (in terms of administrators), the number of job openings at the level of the clerk in 2014–2015, the number of applicants for these positions, and other measures of efficiency and meritocracy.

In January 2017, the survey was sent to approximately 2,300 public administrations and received approximately 740 responses by late April.⁷⁷ Due to missing answers, only 500–680 responses can be used for the empirical analyses.

In addition to the data collected through the survey, I have obtained additional data to control for confounding factors, including tax revenues, population density, migration levels, unemployment rates, and so on.⁷⁸ Importantly, because many of these control variables possibly introduce posttreatment bias, the primary empirical models do not use controls.

Response Locations

Figure 2 shows the communes that responded to the survey on a historical map with the imperial borders of 1815–1914. We see a geographically balanced sample of responses. Communes that were in interwar Germany are represented by light grey boxes. Because of border shifts after World War Two, we

⁷⁵ *Becker/Boeckh/Hainz/Woessmann: The Empire Is Dead.*


⁷⁶ Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej. Dane podmiotów dodanych do strony gł. BIP [Data of entities added to the BIP main page], URL: <https://www.bip.gov.pl>, accessed 19 May 2016.

⁷⁷ Another study on how Polish local administrations' responsiveness is influenced by external factors was later conducted by Charasz and Vogler. See: *Charasz, Paweł/Vogler, Jan P.: Does EU Funding Improve Local State Capacity? Evidence from Polish Municipalities.* In: *European Union Politics* 22/3 (2021), 446–471.

⁷⁸ Central Statistical Office of Poland. Local Data Bank, URL: <http://stat.gov.pl/en/>, accessed April–May 2017; Central Statistical Office of Poland. Population Statistics (2013), URL: http://stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/l_powierzchnia_i_ludnosc_przekroj_terytorialny_2013.xls, accessed 7 April 2017.

need to treat these municipalities differently:⁷⁹ Formerly Prussian lands with German majorities were given to Poland. Associated with these transfers were massive population resettlements, which potentially violate the historical mechanisms that were established in the previous section.⁸⁰ Thus, I control for historical affiliation with interwar Germany. Geographic data was obtained from different sources.⁸¹

Figure 2: Location of Communes and the Imperial Borders of 1900. This map is partly based on the following source: © Euro-Geographics for the administrative boundaries, at URL: <http://www.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/geodata/reference-data/administrative-units-statistical-units>.



⁷⁹ In addition to the border shifts after World War Two, it is important to note that Poland's eastern borders were not decided in the peace negotiations of 1919 because of an ongoing military conflict with Russia. Cf. *Leonhard, Jörn: Die Büchse der Pandora. Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs.* Munich 2020, chapter 8.

⁸⁰ *Biskupski: The history of Poland, 123–125; Lukowski/Zawadzki: A Concise History of Poland, 278–279; Prazmowska: A History of Poland, 192–196.*

⁸¹ GeoNames geographical database (2012), URL: <http://www.geonames.org/>, accessed 20 May 2017; *Nüssli, Christos/Nüssli, Marc-Antoine: Georeferenced Historical Vector Data 1900 (2008)*, URL: http://www.euratlas.net/shop/maps_gis/gis_1900.html, Data accessed through the Duke University Library 28 February 2017; MPIDR (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research) and CGG (Chair for Geodesy and Geoinformatics, University of Rostock): MPIDR Population History GIS Collection – Europe (partly based on © EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries), Rostock 2013, URL: <https://censusmosaic.demog.berkeley.edu/data/historical-gis-files>, accessed 22 May 2017; Eurostat. Administrative units/Statistical units, URL: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/geodata/reference-data/administrative-units-statistical-units>, accessed 7 August 2017; MPIDR and CGG: MPIDR Population History GIS 2012, URL: <https://censusmosaic.demog.berkeley.edu/data/historical-gis-files>, accessed 22 May 2017.

Empirical Techniques

To estimate the magnitude of diverging outcomes between the parts of Poland that were historically ruled by different empires, I use multiple statistical techniques, including (1) simple dummy variable analysis and (2) a regression discontinuity design. A description of the empirical results can be found below.

Empirical Test: Results

Simultaneous Comparison of All Partitions

Figure 3 shows the results of the first set of regressions when all partitions are compared simultaneously. Russian communes have approximately 6–9 percent more employees than Prussian communes. I obtain a very similar result for communes that were part of interwar Germany (5–10 percent more employees than Prussian communes that did not belong to interwar Germany). This is interesting because most people who were relocated to communes of interwar Germany came from the formerly Russian parts (although some also came from Eastern Galicia), meaning that the results are an indirect confirmation of the imperial-legacies perspective. Austrian communes appear to be the most efficient with approximately 8 percent fewer employees than Prussian communes in the model without covariates.




Figure 3: Coefficient Plot. Simple Dummy Variables (All Partitions)

Furthermore, Russian communes have approximately 17–28 percent fewer applicants per job than Prussian communes. Similarly, Austrian communes have approximately 19–21 percent fewer applicants than Prussian communes. Without covariates, communes in interwar Germany show a similar pattern, but the results are no longer statistically significant when covariates are included.

These results provide initial (limited) evidence in favor of imperial legacies with respect to public administration. With the exception of the lower number of applicants in the Austrian partition, the results of all models are in the theoretically expected direction. Austrian communes appear to be the most efficient, strengthening the argument that decentralization can positively affect bureaucratic efficiency in the long run. Importantly, as indicated previously, the models with covariates need to be interpreted with caution due to the substantial possibility of posttreatment bias.

Direct Graphical Comparison of Empires

In this section, I directly compare differences across the borders of pairs of empires. We begin with Prussia and Russia. In this comparison (as shown in Figure 4), we observe the strongest legacy effect in terms of applicants per job. Communes in the formerly Prussian territories (on the left side of the vertical line that represents the historical border with Russia) have significantly more applicants, indicating higher levels of competitiveness and meritocracy in recruitment processes.




Figure 4: Prussia/Russia Comparison (Full Sample). Applicants per Job (Log).

When comparing the formerly Austrian and Russian parts (as shown in Figure 5), the most striking differences are in the number of employees. The results indicate that communes in the formerly Austrian parts (on the left side of the

vertical line that represents the historical border with Russia) are significantly more efficient as they need fewer human resources to conduct the same set of organizational tasks.




Figure 5: Austria/Russia Comparison (Full Sample). Employees per 1,000 Inhabitants (Log)

In the final comparison of Prussia and Austria (as shown in Figure 6), we again observe marked differences in terms of the number of employees. The graphic shows that Austrian communes (on the right side of the vertical line that represents the historical border with Prussia) are superior even to Prussian communes when it comes to their overall efficiency.




Figure 6: Prussia/Austria Comparison (Full Sample). Employees per 1,000 Inhabitants (Log)

Conclusion

This chapter underscores that the disciplines of political science and history can strongly benefit from entering a constructive dialogue. In very practical terms the underlying research project has already profited from such a conversation throughout its development, and — as a part of this volume — it further advances an ongoing interdisciplinary exchange.

Beyond its interdisciplinary ambition, this chapter also addresses several major issues in existing political economy research on imperial legacies. Among others, it is one of the first studies to examine bureaucratic legacies in a rigorous research design based on an in-depth historical analysis. In the *long nineteenth century*, there were vast differences between the public administrations of the three imperial powers that ruled Poland: Austria and Prussia had been the earliest developers of modern bureaucratic institutions.⁸² Although their administrative systems were externally imposed on the Polish people, they were generally characterized by high levels of meritocracy and bureaucratic efficiency, and they were considered reliable and effective by local populations. Additionally, in the second half of the nineteenth century, Austria decentralized its administrative apparatus and provided the Poles with many more avenues for administrative participation. Yet Prussia's administration, while highly effective and reliable, remained centralized and systematically excluded Polish citizens, which could produce differential legacies. Furthermore, compared to both Prussia and Austria, Russia's public administration was *highly* corrupt and inefficient, and it suffered from extremely low levels of meritocracy. Specifically, recruitment and promotion was primarily based on patronage and personal networks, leading to bureaucratic incompetence and ineffectiveness. As a consequence, in the Russian partition, the Poles developed an antagonistic relationship to the state, which could have long-term implications for bureaucratic organization and the quality of state-citizen interactions.

My analyses show that these distinct historical patterns still affect some aspects of contemporary public administration in Poland (whereas there also is little to no effect in some other comparisons). Specifically, I find that former Russian communes perform worst on measures of efficiency and meritocracy (H1 and H2). There is also (more limited) evidence of a positive long-term Habsburg effect on bureaucratic efficiency (H3). An additional analysis of historical data from both the interwar and communist periods suggests that the observed differences are deeply rooted and have survived various historical regimes. Comparable patterns can clearly be identified for the time of communist rule, during which administrations in the east were significantly larger. Moreover, as existing studies, survey data, and expert interviews show, this long-

⁸² Vogler, Jan P.: Bureaucracies. In: *Jenkins, Jeffery A./Rubin, Jared* (Eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy*. Oxford (Expected 2023).

term persistence of bureaucratic structures can be explained by (1) the endurance of culture, affecting administrative norms and behavior, and (2) attitudes towards the bureaucracy, influencing recruitment patterns.

All in all, this chapter provides an optimistic perspective on the possibilities for interdisciplinary collaboration. Indeed, scholars from history and political science can learn a lot from each other. Historians' extremely detailed and comprehensive knowledge of historical cases can strongly benefit political research. In turn, political scientists may uncover patterns of (long-term) development that have not been identified by historians yet. Furthermore, history may profit from the research designs as well as the statistical toolkit that political scientists have applied in the last decades. Thus, collaboration between political science and history can benefit both disciplines in many and possibly surprising ways.⁸³

⁸³ Many other contributions on the historical political economy of bureaucracy and state building showcase the deep connections between history and political science, indicating that there is significant room for future collaboration. See, among others, *Ansell*, Ben W./*Lindvall*, Johannes: *Inward Conquest. The Political Origins of Modern Public Services*. Cambridge 2020; *Buzan*, Barry/*Lawson*, George: *The Global Transformation. History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations*. Cambridge 2015; *Cornell*, Agnes/*Knutsen*, Carl Henrik/*Teorell*, Jan: *Bureaucracy and Growth*. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 53/14 (2020), 2246–2282; *Cornell*, Agnes/*Svensson*, Ted: *Colonial origins of modern bureaucracy? India and the professionalization of the British civil service*. In: *Governance* (2022); *Juan*, Alexander de/*Haass*, Felix/*Pierskalla*, Jan: *The Partial Effectiveness of Indoctrination in Autocracies. Evidence from the German Democratic Republic*. In: *World Politics* 73/4 (2021), 593–628; *Dincecco*, Mark: *The Rise of Effective States in Europe*. In: *The Journal of Economic History* 75/3 (2015), 901–918; *Johnson*, Noel D./*Koyama*, M.: *States and Economic Growth. Capacity and Constraints*. In: *Explorations in Economic History* 64 (2017), 1–20; *Mattingly*, Daniel C.: *Colonial Legacies and State Institutions in China. Evidence from a Natural Experiment*. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 50/4 (2017), 434–463; *Queralt*, Didac: *War, International Finance, and Fiscal Capacity in the Long Run*. In: *International Organization* 73/4, 713–753; *Sasaki*, Yu: *The Royal Consultants. The Intendants of France and the Bureaucratic Transition in Pre-modern Europe*. In: *Journal of Historical Political Economy* 1/2 (2021), 259–282; *Suryanarayan*, Pavithra/*White*, Steven: *Slavery, Reconstruction, and Bureaucratic Capacity in the American South*. In: *American Political Science Review* 115/2 (2021), 568–584; *Wang*, Yuhua: *The Rise and Fall of Imperial China. The Social Origins of State Development*. Princeton/NJ 2022; *Zhang*, Nan/*Lee*, Melissa M.: *Literacy and State–Society Interactions in Nineteenth-Century France*. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 64/4 (2020), 1001–1016.